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Trial Practice and Procedure
by Philip W. Savrin*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys the 1996 decisions of the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals that have a significant impact on issues relating to trial
practice and procedure.
II.

JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES

A. Federal Question Jurisdiction
1. Constitutional Challenges. The Eleventh Circuit held in
Boatman v. Town of Oakland1 that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to consider a property owner's action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against a Florida town for denial of a certificate of occupancy.
Plaintiffs attempted to construct and occupy a manufactured home in
one of the town's residential districts. The town refused to issue a
certificate of occupancy because plaintiffs' home was designated a
"mobile home" in violation of a zoning-ordinance. Plaintiffs sought an
injunction directing the town to issue the certificate, money damages,
and attorney fees under section 1983.2 Their complaint alleged that the
ordinance was arbitrary and capricious, violated their due process rights

* Partner in the law firm of Freeman, Mathis & Gary, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia. Clark
University (B.A., with high honors, 1981); Boston University (J.D., cum laude, 1985). Law
Clerk to the Honorable Harold L. Murphy of the Northern District of Georgia, 1988-1990.
Staff Attorney, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 1985-1988.
Member, American Bar Association, State Bar of Georgia, Atlanta Bar Association, Federal
Bar Association.
1. 76 F.3d 341 (11th Cir. 1996).
2. Id. at 343.
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under the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprived them of their vested
property right?3
The district court found plaintiffs' home did not fit the definition of a
mobile home under the ordinance, and awarded compensatory damages.4 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, however, finding that subject
matter jurisdiction was absent on several grounds? First, the determination of what constitutes a mobile home under the ordinance was a
question of state law. Second, plaintiffs had no constitutional or
statutory authority to support their contention that the ordinance
exceeded the town's police power.7 The court found the ordinance was
fully accepted by the Florida Department of Community Affairs, an
agency that governs whether the growth plans of local governments
comply with state laws.? Furthermore, the court perceived no substantive due process ground, and any procedural due process claim was
meritless because plaintiffs were afforded sufficient due process by the
state.9 In this regard, the court noted that several options were
available for the resolution of plaintiffs' dispute at the county and state
levels-options which plaintiffs had disregarded completely. 0
2. Challenges to Congressional Regulations and Legislation
Affecting Veterans' Benefits. In Hall v. United States Department
of Veterans'Affairs, n the Eleventh Circuit questioned the vitality of the
Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Robison,' which held that
district courts have jurisdiction over facial constitutional challenges to
congressional legislation affecting veterans' benefits.18 Plaintiff, a state
prison inmate, filed a pro se action in district court challenging the
constitutional validity of a congressional regulation" that reduced his
VA disability benefits. 5 The district court sua sponte dismissed the
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 511(a).16
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, citing provisions in the Veterans' Judicial

3. Id. at 343-44.
4. Id. at 344.

5. Id.
6. Id. at 345.

7. Id.
8. Id.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 346.
Id. at 345.
85 F.3d 532 (11th Cir. 1996).
415 U.S. 361 (1974).
Id at 366-74.
38 C.F.R. § 3.665 (1996).
85 F.3d at 532-33.
Id. at 533.
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Review Act ("VJRA7), 7 which vests judicial scrutiny of regulations
affecting benefits exclusively in the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.'8
In light of congressional intent in the VJRA to place judicial review of
regulations at the appellate level, the court reasoned, the validity of the
Johnson decision is debatable. 9 The Eleventh Circuit noted a continued split among several circuits with respect to the jurisdiction of
district courts to entertain challenges to legislation affecting benefits,'"
but declined to reach the issue because plaintiff did not specify a
challenge to legislation.2 '
3. Disbarment Proceedings. Federal court jurisdiction over
matters of state bar admissions, bar disciplinary actions, and disbarments was the subject of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Matter of
Calvo.22 Calvo, an attorney, was found to have violated federal
securities laws, and a district court enjoined him from further violations.
The Florida Bar began disciplinary actions against him that resulted in
his disbarment.' In response to an order from the federal court to
show cause why he should not be barred from practicing in federal court
as well, Calvo filed a pleading that alleged constitutional defects in the
The district court nevertheless ordered
state court proceedings.'
plaintiff's disbarment.
Before reaching the merits of the district court's disbarment order, the
Eleventh Circuit first examined whether federal courts have jurisdiction
to hear disbarment proceedings. After noting that it could find no
authority in its own precedent or in decisions from the Supreme Court,
the Eleventh Circuit expressed a concern over whether a "case or
controversy" existed under Article III of the United States Constitution.
In finding that federal courts do have jurisdiction, the court reasoned
that the "case or controversy" requirement focuses on the "nature and
effect" of the ruling, and not its form." Given the adversarial nature
of disbarment proceedings, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately determined

17.

38 U.S.C. § 7104 (1994).

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

85 F.3d at 534.
Id.
Id. at 534-35.
Id. at 535.
88 F.3d 962 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
Id. at 964.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 965.
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that a justiciable case or controversy was presented and affirmed Calvo's
disbarment from federal court proceedings."
4. Aid to Families with Dependent Children. The decision in
Maynard v. Williams' addressed whether a private right of action
exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the childcare provisions of the
Family Support Act of 1988.
Plaintiffs filed a section 1983 suit
claiming that a freeze by the State of Florida on childcare benefits for
families participating in a job training and education project under the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children 0 ("AFDC") program deprived
them of their right to education. Plaintiffs alleged that 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(g) imposes an obligation on states, regardless of financial
constraints, to guarantee childcare services to all AFDC recipients
involved in the program.3 '
The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment,
but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that under the Supreme
Court's two-step analysis in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles,3' section 1983 does not provide a right of action for the
enforcement of 42 U.S.C. § 602(g)." Although Congress intended the
childcare provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 602(g) to benefit plaintiffs, that
statute did not create a "binding obligation" upon states to guarantee
childcare as a part of the job and education, training program."
Instead, Congress intended for states simply to consider all their
resources available for the program, including those for childcare
services.'
B. Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction-Amountin Controversy
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service
Corp.' involved an interesting issue of removal and the burden of proof
for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Plaintiff filed a state law class
action against defendants alleging common law and statutory fraud and
civil conspiracy arising from service contracts on automobiles.," After

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 964-65.
72 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 1996).
42 U.S.C. § 602(g) (1994).
42 U.S.C. §§ 601-18 (1994).
72 F.3d at 850.
493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989).
72 F.3d at 855.
Id.
Id. at 854.
77 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id at 1355.
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defendant removed the action to federal court, plaintiffs filed a motion
to remand on grounds of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that each
class member's demands for damages failed to meet the requisite amount
for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.' The district court
denied the motion, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed."s In so ruling,
the court of appeals addressed the burden of proof required for diversity
jurisdiction in removal when a plaintiff has made an unspecified demand
for damages in a state court.40 With an unspecified amount, a burden
of proof lower than a legal certainty is required because there is no
measuring stick available to determine appropriate damages for
purposes of diversity.4 ' A defendant, however, must still prove that the
plaintiffs would not recover less than the statutory amount required for
diversity." Thus, the court held that a removing defendant must show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy more
likely than not exceeds the jurisdictional threshold."
Concerning the satisfaction of the amount in controversy requirement,
the Eleventh Circuit then decided for the first time that punitive
damages could be aggregated." The court of appeals first noted that
resolution of the issue did not turn upon whether the action arose from
multiple individual transactions or a single act.46 Instead, the court
relied on state law governing punitive damages and found that punitive
damages are collective in nature and are awarded for the public good."
Because punitive damages reflect defendant's conduct toward all of the
class members, it was proper to consider their damages in the aggregate.47 However, the court of appeals limited its ruling to its facts and
cautioned against a bright-line rule that any class claim for damages
could be aggregated for diversity purposes.4
C. PersonalJurisdictionunder Florida'sLong-Arm Statute
The issue of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant was
the subject of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Robinson v. Giarmarco

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1356-57.
41. Id. at 1357.
42. Id.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. at 1357-58.

45. Id. at 1358 n.11.
46. Id. at 1358-59.
47.

Id. at 1359.

48. Id.
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& Bill, P.C.49 The litigation arose from estate planning services
provided by defendants, which plaintiff alleged were negligent."
Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or change
of venue, claiming Florida's long-arm statute did not extend to foreign
tortious acts.51 The district court denied the motion, finding both
jurisdiction and venue proper.5"
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit first addressed the extent of the longarm statute, noting its previous finding in Sun Bank, NA v. E.F
Hutton & Co." that the reach of the statute" outside the state was
unclear.55 Despite an attempt by Florida courts to define the parameters of the statute, according to the court of appeals, the extent of
jurisdiction remained cloudy."
As a result, the Eleventh Circuit
followed its decision in Sun Bank, holding that personal jurisdiction
under the statute is not limited to negligent acts within the state, but
also extends to foreign acts causing injury within the state. 7 Defendants maintained sufficient contact within the state to justify the
exercise of personal jurisdiction by centering their estate planning
services for the decedent around Florida law."
Jurisdiction further
comported with due process because the state had a significant interest
in adjudicating a suit involving assets within its borders. 59 The court
concluded by stating that the convenience for plaintiff and absence of a
great burden on defendants supported plaintiff's venue selection.'
D. Abstention Doctrines
1. Younger Abstention."' In Pompey v. Broward County,62 the
Eleventh Circuit applied the Younger abstention doctrine to an
interesting issue involving "Daddy Roundups," a Florida county's effort
to punish deadbeat parents. Plaintiffs were a group of fathers who had
been or who were going to be ordered incarcerated for failure to pay

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

74 F.3d 253 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 256.
Id.
Id
926 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1991).
FLA. STAT. ch. 48.193(1)(b) (1994).
74 F.3d at 257.
Id.
I.
Id at 259.
Id.
Id at 260.
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
95 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1996).
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child support. They brought suit in federal district court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 seeking injunctive relief from the county court's allegedly
unconstitutional practice of not advising parents of the right to courtappointed counsel, of not appointing counsel for indigent parents, and of
not sufficiently inquiring about each parent's ability to pay the support.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on
Younger abstention grounds, and plaintiffs appealed.In affirming, the Eleventh Circuit noted other areas to which the
abstention doctrine has been applied." Although the relief sought by
plaintiffs was no less intrusive than other areas of abstention, the court
found the difficulty of framing the injunction militated against federal
court intervention."5 The court noted that an overriding concern at the
heart of the Younger abstention doctrine is comity between state and
federal governments, and that the relief sought by plaintiffs would
unnecessarily and improperly intrude on the business of the state courts
of Florida." Accordingly, the dismissal was affirmed.67
2. Rooker-Feldman Abstention. The district court's jurisdiction
over a challenge to a state court divorce action in light of the Supreme
Court decision in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman'
was the issue in Powell v. Powell.8 The litigation arose after a state
court awarded part of plaintiff's naval retirement pay to his ex-wife
pursuant to the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act
('FSPA").7o Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court against his ex-wife
and the Secretary of the Navy, alleging the FSPA was unconstitutional
and amounted to a taking of his property." The district court entered
summary judgment in favor of defendants, and held the FSPA was
constitutional."2
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the Secretary of the Navy's
claim that the district court's jurisdiction was barred under the RookerFeldman doctrine, which prohibits district court review of final state
court judgments. 73 The court of appeals found that the doctrine was

63,
64.
65.
66.
67,
68.
69,
70.
71.
72,
73.

Id- at 1546.
I. at 1548.
1& at 1549.
Id. at 1550.
Id. at 1553.
460 U.S. 462 (1983).
80 F.3d 464 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 465.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 466.
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not limited to state court decisions based solely on state law, but applies
to issues that are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court
judgment, regardless of whether the issues were actually raised in state
court' The only significant limitation on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
exists when a plaintiff has no reasonable opportunity to raise a federal
claim in state court." Because in Powell plaintiff had full opportunity
to raise his constitutional challenge to the FSPA in state court but failed
to address it, the Eleventh Circuit found the district court lacked
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.76
E. Preemption of State Law
1. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") brought suit
against former officers and directors of a savings and loan in FDIC v.
Stahl," alleging negligence in managing several target loans. After the
jury awarded a verdict in favor of the FDIC, the district court set aside
the verdict and entered a "take-nothing" judgment for defendants.7"
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit framed the issue as whether the gross
negligence standard in section 1821(k) of the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA7) preempted state
standard of care laws for purposes of the standard to be applied to
actions of directors.79 Congressional intent to allow for the application
of state law, according to the court, was demonstrated in the "other
applicable law" language of the statute." Although case law in other
circuits upholds preemption of federal common law by the gross
negligence standard in section 1821(k), the court emphasized the absence
of case law supporting preemption of state common law.81 The court
therefore concluded that section 1821(k) does not preempt state
standards
of fault that require less of a showing than gross negli82
gence

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. at 467.
I& at 467-68.
89 F.3d 1510 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1512.
Id. at 1514-15.
Id at 1515.
Id. at 1515-16.
Id. at 1516.
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2. Federal Election Campaign Act. In Teper v. Miller,8 a
member of the Georgia General Assembly sought an injunction
prohibiting state officials from enforcing a provision in the Georgia
Ethics in Government Act" barring members from accepting campaign
contributions during a legislative session. Plaintiff was considering a
campaign for federal office and claimed the provision would seriously
compromise his efforts compared to other federal candidates who are not
state officials." The district court, in granting the injunction, found
plaintiff had a significant chance of success in claiming the provision
was preempted by the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA7)." The
court's ruling was limited solely to enjoining enforcement of the
provision as it relates to federal elections."'
The Eleventh Circuit agreed and upheld the injunction." In examining the scope of both the FECA and the Georgia provision, the court of
appeals held the Georgia provision was preempted to the extent it
limited the period in which an Assembly member could accept contributions for a federal campaign. 9 Despite the valid purpose of the state
provision in preventing financial improprieties, the court found that the
provision must yield to the greater interests of the FECA. Because
the preemption provision in the FECA is unambiguous, the court of
appeals turned to the Federal Election Commission's ("FEC")interpretation, which prohibits state limits on contributions and expenditures of
federal candidates.9 ' In deferring to the FEC, the Eleventh Circuit
cited the Supreme Court decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,' which directed the court to rely on
administrative agency interpretations where a federal statute is
unclear.98
Before reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the
Chevron rule is anomalous in that preemption requires unambiguous
statutory language, yet Chevron requires deference to agency interpreta-

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

82 F.3d 989 (11th Cir. 1996).
O.C.GA. § 21-5-35 (1993).
82 F.3d at 992.
Id.
Id. at 993.
Id. at 999.
Id. at 994-95.
I& at 995.
Id. at 995-96.

92. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
93. Id at 843-44.
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tions if the statute is ambiguous." The Eleventh Circuit ultimately left
this issue aside for another day, finding it was not necessary given the
clarity of the congressional intent in this particular regard."
3. Admiralty-Nonpecuniary Damages. The recent Supreme
Court decision in Yamaha Motor Corp., U.SA. v. Calhoun," concerning
the right of personal representatives to recover nonpecuniary damages
in an admiralty action, was addressed by the Eleventh Circuit in
American Dredging Co. v. Lambert." In response to American Dredging's petition for exoneration from liability, the personal representatives
sought pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages for the death of nonseamen
in territorial waters. 98 The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the personal representatives."
On appeal, plaintiffs asserted that the uniform federal scheme applied
to all deaths in territorial waters and displaced state wrongful death and
survival statutes.'0° In rejecting this argument, the Eleventh Circuit
relied upon the Calhoun decision, in which the Supreme Court held that
federal maritime law does not displace state nonpecuniary damages." 1
Given the absence of federal statute or common law precluding personal
representatives from recovering nonpecuniary damages, the court of
appeals affirmed."°
III.

A.

PROCEDURAL BARs To RECOVERY

Res Judicata

1. Exclusive versus Concurrent Jurisdiction. In Aquatherm
Industries, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co.,"° the Eleventh Circuit,
in a matter of first impression, addressed the question of whether res
judicata bars litigation of a claim that was not brought in a prior state
court action due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction in that prior
proceeding. Aquatherm, a manufacturer of solar-powered heating
systems for swimming pools, filed state antitrust claims in a Florida

94. 82 F.3d at 998.
95. Ud

96. 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996).
97.
98.
99.
100.

81 F.3d 127 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id at 129.
Id.
Id. at 130.

101. Id.
102. Id. at 130-31.
103. 84 F.3d 1388 (11th Cir. 1996).
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state court, alleging that statements made by defendant to its customers
unfairly advantaged the market for electric pool heaters.'"' When
Aquatherm later amended its complaint to add a federal Lanham
Act"' claim, defendant removed the action to federal court."° Aquatherm withdrew its federal cause of action, causing the case to be
remanded back to the state court system.'07
Meanwhile, Aquatherm filed a federal action to allege antitrust
violations under the Sherman Act,' and reasserted its claim under
the Lanham Act. Aquatherm later amended its claims to add antitrust
claims under the Clayton Act."° The district court dismissed the
entire federal lawsuit, finding that res judicata barred Aquatherm's
antitrust and Lanham Act claims."1 The issue on appeal was whether
Aquatherm's lawsuit was barred due to the dismissal of its related
claims by the Florida court.
In reaching the issue on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit differentiated
between the antitrust and the Lanham Act claims: whereas federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction of the former, federal courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts over the latter. Where the
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, the res judicata analysis first
requires a review of the state's preclusion law and allows exceptions
thereto only to the extent authorized by the full faith and credit
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1738." If the courts would have concurrent jurisdiction, however, the state law on preclusion must be adhered
to due to the full faith and credit statute. 1 2
Turning to the facts before it, the Eleventh Circuit then reviewed
Florida's law and found that preclusion is not permitted unless the state
court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in the original
action." Because the state court would not have been able to "hear
the antitrust claims, Florida law would not apply res judicata.
Consequently, Aquatherm could have its federal antitrust claims heard,
notwithstanding the dismissal of its state antitrust claims. '

104. Id. at 1390.
105.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).

106. 84 F.3d at 1390.
107. I&
108.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994).

109. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
110. 84 F.3d at 1391.
111. Id. at 1392.
112. I

113. Id at 1392-93.
114.

Id. at 1394.
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The Eleventh Circuit reached a different conclusion, however, on the
Lanham Act claim. Because the Lanham Act claim could have been
brought in the prior state court proceeding, but was not, Florida law
would bar its litigation."' Consequently, the district court's dismissal
of the Lanham Act claim was affirmed, but its dismissal of the federal
antitrust claims was reversed. 1 6
2. Stay of Arbitration. The Eleventh Circuit addressed a similar
preclusion issue in Sewell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 17 a case involving claims of fraud and mismanagement against
a brokerage firm. Plaintiff, an investor, filed claims for arbitration with
the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"). Instead of
submitting to arbitration, defendant sought a stay of the arbitration in
a New York state court alleging plaintiff's claims did not qualify for
arbitration under section 15 of the NASD Code. Plaintiff did not appear
in state court because he agreed that the NASD lacked jurisdiction to
arbitrate, and the New York court entered a permanent stay of any
arbitration.1 s
Plaintiff then brought suit in Florida, alleging similar claims of fraud
and mismanagement against the same defendant."'
Defendant
removed to federal district court and moved for a dismissal or summary
judgment based on res judicata.'" In agreeing with defendant, the
district court gave full preclusive effect to the New York court's default
judgment.'
Although the New York court did not consider the merits
of plaintiff's case, the
court noted that the effect of the default judgment
122
barred the claims.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court, holding that the New
York court did not address the merits of the case for purposes of res
judicata but merely stayed arbitration for lack of jurisdiction of
NASD.'
Because the New York court stayed those claims on
jurisdictional grounds, res judicata did not bar plaintiff from seeking
legal recovery in the Florida court.' 2"

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id. at 1395.
94 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1516.
Id. at 1516-17.Id. at 1517.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1518.
Id.
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Statute of Limitations for Bivens Actions
In Kelly v. Serna," the Eleventh Circuit decided two issues of first
impression in this circuit: (1) the applicable statute of limitations for
claims of constitutional violations brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics;26 and (2) the accrual
date for those causes of action." Kelly, an attorney whose conviction
for illegal drug activity in federal court had been reversed, 1" filed suit
for malicious prosecution and violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments." The district court dismissed plaintiff's Bivens claims
based on his failure to comply with section 9-3-33 of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A."), which provides a two-year statute of
limitations applicable to a comparable 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.' 30
Although it had not addressed the issue previously, the Eleventh Circuit
had little difficulty following all other circuits that had decided the issue
by adopting the same statute of limitations applicable to claims brought
under section 1983.'"'
Because Georgia's two-year personal injury
statute of limitations applies to section 1983 claims, the court determined that the same1 8limitation
applied to Bivens claims and upheld the
2
lower court's ruling.
Addressing the second issue of first impression, the court of appeals
cited the Supreme Court ruling in Heck v. Humphrey," which held
that a constitutionalclaim that challenges the validity of one's conviction
does not accrue until the conviction has been invalidated.'" Because
Heck applies to Bivens actions, the two-year statute of limitations in
Kelly's case did not accrue until his conviction was reversed."1
Determining the date of reversal for purposes of this rule proved
problematic because Kelly's civil complaint was filed more than two
years after the reversal was entered but less than two years after the
136
government allowed the certiorari period to lapse without a filing.
The Eleventh Circuit found the date of reversal was the accrual of the

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

87 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 1996).
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
87 F.3d at 1238.
United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1989).
87 F.3d at 1238.
Id.
Id.
Id.
512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Id. at 2374.
Kelly, 87 F.3d at 1240.

Id.
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claim-and hence the running of the statute of limitations-but left for
another day the decision whether reversal is entry of the judgment on
appeal or the mandate in the trial court.
Statute of Repose under Florida'sProductsLiability Law
The fluctuating nature of Florida's twelve-year statute of repose was
the subject of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Mosher v. Speedstar
Plaintiff brought a products
Division of AMCA International,Inc.'
liability suit in federal court after he was injured while using a drill rig
in his employment.' 9 A jury verdict in plaintiff's favor was reversed,
and the case was remanded for a new trial due to an error in the jury
instructions.'" Defendant moved for entry of judgment at the new
trial, alleging the action was filed fifteen years after the drill rig was
delivered to plaintiff's employer."" Defendant further claimed that the
Florida state court decision in Firestone 71re & Rubber Co. v. Acosta, 42
prohibited reliance upon legislative or judicial uncertainty about the
The district court agreed and entered
statute's constitutionality.'"
judgment in defendant's favor.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified two questions to the Florida
Supreme Court: (1) whether the "reliance exception" operated to
preserve claims accrued during the statute's period of unconstitutionality; and (2) whether plaintiff could have reasonably relied upon Batilla
v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,' a decision by the supreme
court holding the statute unconstitutional.'" Answering both questions in the affirmative, the Florida Supreme Court stated that the
reliance exception preserved actions arising within the period of the
statute's unconstitutionality and that theAcosta holding only established
that the legislative repeal of the statute did not renew previously barred
claims.'" The supreme court further stated that plaintiff was justified
in relying on the court's decision in Batilla even though his action was
filed after the supreme court resurrected the statute. 47 At the time
of plaintiffs injury, the only time constraint was a four-year statute of
C.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 1240 & n.2.
93 F.3d 746 (11th Cir. 1996).
d. at 747.
Id. at 747-48.
Id. at 748.
612 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1992).
Mosher, 93 F.3d at 748.
392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980).
93 F.3d at 748.
Id. at 749.
Id.
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limitations."
In accordance with the Florida court decision, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court judgment.149
IV
A.

RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY

Equitableand Legal Relief Sought in the Same Proceeding
Plaintiffs' right to a jury trial under the Labor Management Relations

Act ("LMRA)' 5 and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISAL)'5 ' was a matter of first impression in Stewart v. KHD
Deutz of America Corp.' 2 A group of retirees filed a class action suit
alleging that defendant breached two collective bargaining agreements
in failing to provide the proper health benefit coverage during plaintiffs'
In their complaint, plaintiffs requested legal and
retirement."
equitable relief under section 301 of the LMRA and under ERISA.' 4
The district court granted defendant's motion to strike the demand for
a jury trial; the issue for appeal was whether plaintiffs were entitled to
a jury trial for an LMRA claim joined with an ERISA claim that is not
triable bya jury.'".
In resolving this issue, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held
plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment for
their claim under the LMRA. 6 For purposes of the Seventh Amendment, the joinder of the ERISA claim was irrelevant and did not deprive
5 7
In ascertaining the right to
plaintiffs of their right to a jury trial."
a jury trial, the court of appeals likened the breach of the collective
bargaining agreements to a breach of a contract that satisfied the
Because the
common law element of the Seventh Amendment.'"
Eleventh Circuit interprets monetary relief under section 301 of the
LMRA as legal, labeling relief under ERISA as equitable was not
dispositive of the jury trial right.5 9 The court concluded by emphasiz-

148.
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150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id. at 747.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994).
Id. §§ 1104(a), 1132(aX1)(B), 1132(aX3) (1994).
75 F.3d 1522, 1524 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 300 (1996).
75 F.3d at 1524.
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Id. at 1528.
Id. at 1526.
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ing that joinder of the ERISA claim did not create the kind of "imperative circumstance" that militates against a jury trial.' ®
B. Employment DiscriminationClaims
161
The Eleventh Circuit in Goodgame v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.
reversed the district court order setting aside a jury verdict as advisory
under rule 39(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a suit brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.1' Plaintiffs filed a race discrimination suit
against defendant alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964"6 and section 1981.' " While the case was pending, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991,"s thereby expanding the law
applicable to plaintiffs' claims by creating a jury right and expanding the
scope of relief recoverable to include compensatory and punitive
damages.6
Based on these changes in the law, the district court empaneled a jury
to hear plaintiffs' claims. After a verdict in plaintiffs' favor, but before
entry of final judgment, the Eleventh Circuit ruled in a separate case
that the amendments applied prospectively only.' 7 Accordingly, the
district court set aside the jury verdict as "advisory" under Federal Rule
Civil Procedure 39 and issued its own findings of fact and conclusions of
1
law.
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court's application of
Rule 39(c) because plaintiffs' section 1981 claims-separate and apart
from their Title VII claims-were triable by a jury as a matter of
right.169 The court of appeals emphasized that in these cases a trial
court is not authorized to dismiss a jury verdict and impose its own
determination of the claim. 70 Although the scope of damages recoverable under the Title VII claim was properly limited by the district court,
the amounts needed to be determined at a subsequent trial.'"

160. Id. at 1528.
161.
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75 F.3d 1516, 1517 (11th Cir. 1996).
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).

75 F.3d at 1518.
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, 1077 (codified as amended in scattered
of 42 U.S.C.). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (Supp. 1991).
75 F.3d at 1517.
Curtis v. Metro Ambulance Serv., Inc., 982 F.2d 472 (11th Cir. 1993).
75 F.3d at 1517.
Id. at 1520.
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(RULE 12)

72

In In re Johannessen,' the Eleventh Circuit addressed the sufficiency of a complaint alleging fraud and breach of contract to except an
obligation from discharge under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 17
After plaintiffs filed a state court complaint alleging fraud and breach
of contract, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, and a
judgment was entered.174 Defendants subsequently filed a voluntary
petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. Plaintiffs refied their
complaint in the bankruptcy court to determine the dischargeability of
the debt. 76 The bankruptcy court ultimately entered an order grantRule of
ing defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice under Federal
176
affirmed.
court
district
the
and
12(b)(6),
Procedure
Civil
Plaintiffs appealed, alleging the district court erroneously imposed
upon them the burden of proving the facts of their complaint while
opposing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). 77 The Eleventh
Circuit agreed and held that the district court misinterpreted its
precedent concerning the sufficiency of a complaint for an exception
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).' 7' The court of appeals emphasized
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require litigants to
prove the facts of a claim in detail and that district courts must accept
the allegations as true.'79 In reviewing the elements of a complaint
under 11 U.S.C. § 523, the court of appeals found plaintiffs sufficiently
alleged that: (1) defendant made a false statement intended to deceive
plaintiffs; (2) plaintiffs relied upon the statement; (3) their reliance was
justified; and (4) plaintiffs sustained monetary damages as a result of
Accordingly, the claims could proceed.'""
defendant's falsehood."s
The Eleventh Circuit decision in Johannessen, although a bankruptcy
case, applies with full force to Rule 12(b)(6) motions as well.
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76 F.3d 347 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 348. Chapter 7 is codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1994).
76 F.3d at 348.
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POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS (RULES 59 AND 60)

A.

Rule 59
In In re Southeast Bank Corp.,'8 2 plaintiff, a Chapter 7 trustee,
sought to establish that certain ad valorem taxes on artwork were
invalid and that the related tax lien was avoidable." s The bankruptcy
court ruled in favor of the taxing authority and entered final judgment.
The trustee successfully moved for rehearing, but the motion was not
filed until twelve days had passed from the entry of judgment.'" On
appeal, the district court affirmed."
The taxing authority then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which
reversed on jurisdictional grounds. Specifically, under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e), the trustee's rehearing notice was due with ten
days of the entry ofjudgment. Because the motion was filed twelve days
after judgment, the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to rehear its
decision, and its original ruling had to be reinstated.'

B. Rule 60
1. Excusable Neglect. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),
a court may relieve a party from an adverse final judgment for
"excusable neglect" by the party's legal representative.""7 Whether
counsel's failure to demand a trial de novo within thirty days under a
local rule constituted excusable neglect was the subject of the Eleventh
Circuit ruling in Cheney v. Anchor Glass ContainerCorp.'M
Plaintiff filed an age discrimination suit in a Florida state court,
alleging both state and federal claims, and defendant removed to federal
court. After the district court recommended arbitration, an arbitration
panel determined that plaintiff failed to prove pretext.'
Plaintiff's
attorney failed to file a demand for trial de novo within thirty days as
required by Middle District of Florida Local Rule 8.05(b); instead, a
demand was fied six days late.' °
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97 F.3d 476 (11th Cir. 1996).
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FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
71 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 849.
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The Eleventh Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's analysis in
PioneerInvestment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. PartnerThe Suship'91 to define "excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b).'
preme Court in Pioneer evaluated the issue in Rule 60(b) in terms of
filing deadlines, holding that excusable neglect includes conduct
attributable to negligence. 1' The Court found that whether a party's
failure to timely file constitutes excusable neglect is an equitable
decision based on an analysis of the following factors: (1) the danger of
prejudice to opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its possible
effect on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether
the moving party acted in good faith in failing to comply. 94 In
reversing the district court, the Eleventh Circuit attached primary
significance to the fact that defendant did not suffer prejudice as a result
of plaintiff's filing his demand for a trial de novo a mere six days after
the deadline. 1
2. Review of Rule 60(b)(6) Motions. In Rice v. Ford Motor
Co., the Eleventh Circuit addressed the scope of relief and standard
of review for Rule 60(b)(6) decisions. After plaintiffs' proposed class
action was dismissed voluntarily before certification, Ford moved for a
review of the judgment to determine the effect of the dismissal on absent
members of the proposed class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(e). The district court denied the motion, stating that the approval
and notice requirements of Rule 23(e) did not apply to putative class
In affirming the district
actions before certification of the class.'
court, the Eleventh Circuit noted that Ford's motion was filed beyond
the ten-day post-judgment period required under Rule 59(e) and
therefore construed it as arising under the "catch-all" provision in Rule
60(b)(6)." Because Rule 60(b)(6) motions apply to exceptional circumstances only, and are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard,
the court did not reach the legality of the district court's ruling. Instead,
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed because the district court had considered
Ford's arguments, and any "legal mistake" by the district court could
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193.
194.
195.
196.
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507 U.S. 380 (1993).
71 F.3d at 849.
507 U.S. at 394.
Id. at 395.
71 F.3d at 850.
88 F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 1996).
88 F.3d at 914.
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have been corrected had Ford appealed directly instead of moving under
Rule 60(b). 1"
VII.

TAXATION OF COSTS

The Eleventh Circuit in Morrison v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.,'
considered for the first time the taxation of costs for videotaped
depositions under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 30(b)(2) and (3)."' Plaintiffs sought damages in a personal
injury action for exposure to fumes resulting from a chemical explosion
and fire at defendant's plant.'
After a jury verdict in favor of
defendant, plaintiffs moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
or a new trial.'
The district court denied the motion and taxed
plaintiffs with the 2costs
for expert witnesses and video depositions in
4
favor of defendant. 0
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's denial of plaintiffs'
motion, but reversed the taxation of costs for expert witnesses because
the court exceeded the forty dollar per day limit for nonappointed
witness fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1821.20" The court acknowledged the
extreme disparity between the statutory rate and "economic reality," but
found no room for discretion in this regard.2 m The Eleventh Circuit
further reversed the district court, finding that the costs incurred by
defendant for equipment rental and fees to the videographer for 2a7
playback of the deposition at trial were not taxable to plaintiffs.
Reading 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2) in conjunction with Rule 30(b), the court
determined that taxation of videotaped depositions is allowed under 28
U.S.C. § 1920(2) only as long as the deposing party notices the deposition as being recorded by nonstenographic means or by both stenographic and nonstenographic means.'
Because defendant had not done so,
the costs could not be awarded.
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MISCELLANEOUS

Substitution or Addition of Counsel
Robinson v. Boeing Co.2' involved the discretion of a trial court to
allow the substitution or addition of counsel in the midst of litigation.21 The litigation concerned claims of race and sex discrimination
brought by several employees against their employer. Defendant sought
to associate a third law firm as additional trial counsel fifteen months
Because a nephew of the trial judge was eminto the litigation."
ployed with the firm, a different district court heard the motion. The
request for substitute counsel was then denied based on a number of
factors including the lack of a need for additional counsel, the potential
for delay, and because the judge assigned to the case would need to be
recused.2 12
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the ruling as within the full discretion of
the trial judge and held that defendant's fundamental right to counsel
was not infringed.2 13 The court of appeals was clearly concerned about
the possibility that defendant was judge shopping" by selecting an
attorney who would in turn require the recusal of the judge. 14 Under
all the factors, the court concluded that denial of the motion fell properly
within the district court's broad discretionary powers. 15

A.

B. 'Bankruptcy-Accrualof Interest on a Trustee's Claim
The issue of first impression in In re Glados, Inc.216 was whether
Chapter 7 trustees are entitled to an award of interest accruing from the
date of the award or from the date of their appointment. 217 A debtor
filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy that was converted
to Chapter 7. Following the liquidation of the debtor's estate and
settlement of all claims, the appointed trustee and his counsel sought
compensation for work in two lawsuits involving the debtor. The United
States trustee objected to the proposed compensation based on the
apportionment of the estate's surplus funds for interest to the trustee

209.
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213.

79 F.3d 1053 (11th Cir. 1996).
79 F.3d at 1053.
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and counsel."1 8 The bankruptcy court awarded compensation for
219
The court held that
administrative fees and interest on those fees.
interest for the trustee's fees accrued from the date of appointment
under 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)5).no The court further held that interest on
the fees of nontrustee professionals accrued from the 2date of filing fee
applications. 221 The district court affirmed the ruling. n
The Eleventh Circuit did not agree with the lower courts' analyses of
11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5), and reversed.22 The court recognized that 11
U.S.C. § 726(a)(5) references other sections of the Bankruptcy Code,
thereby creating a conflict in any literal reading of section 726(a)(5).'
In determining when interest begins to accrue under the statute, the
court followed the Ninth Circuit ruling in In re Riverside-Linden
Investment Co.2 and held that interest is paid from the time of the
court's award and not from the time of appointment.'
In addition to
this legal precedent, the Eleventh Circuit found that a policy reason
justified adoption of the Ninth Circuit rule: to prevent a trustee from
delaying the case by accruing interest earlier.227 The Eleventh Circuit
accordingly reversed the district court's judgment, finding that interest
for trustees
and other professionals accrued from the date of the fee
2
award. z
C.

Contribution Claims and Joint Tortfeasors
In Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Tanker Robert Watt Miller,22
the Eleventh Circuit addressed the ability of joint tortfeasors to recover
on claims of contribution after the claims by the injured parties have
been settled. In that case, a tanker collision resulted in personal
injuries (including deaths) and property damage; After settling the
claims, Great Lakes pursued contribution claims against Chevron
Corporation. Chevron successfully moved for dismissal in the district
court on the theory that joint tortfeasors, by definition, cannot recover
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due to the absence of proportionate fault.' In so ruling, the district
court relied primarily on the Supreme Court decisions in McDermott,
Inc. v. AmClyde,"' and Boca Grande Club, Inc. v. Florida Power &
Light Co.,'2 both of which were issued during the pendency of the trial
on the contribution claims.'
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in
The court agreed that Great Lakes, as a joint tortfeasor with
part.'
Chevron, could not seek contribution for those claims to which joint
But as to other claims, such as "maintenance and
liability applied.'
cure," in which the parties are liable to the extent of their "proportionate
share" of fault, Great Lakes' contribution claims could proceed.' The
case was therefore remanded for further proceedings consistent with the
Eleventh Circuit's opinion.'
D. Georgia's FairBusiness PracticesAct
Friedlanderv. PDK Labs, Inc.' involved the answer by the Georgia
Supreme Court to a question certified by the Eleventh Circuit concerning
the unsettled question of standing of nonconsumers to bring suit under
The litigation
Georgia's Fair Business Practices Act ("FBPA).'
involved a suit brought by a diet control drug patentee alleging
The district court dismissed the suit,
violations of the FBPA.'
finding plaintiff could not bring suit under the FBPA in a representative
capacity for the general consuming public without first personally
suffering harm.ul
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit framed the issue as whether the
phrase "consumers and legitimate business enterprise" under section 101-39(a) of the O.C.G.A. is limited solely to individual members of the
consuming public. 2 The Georgia Supreme Court answered affirmatively in Friedlanderv. PDK Labs, Inc.,' stating that only a member
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of the consuming public, whether individual or business, is eligible to
bring claims under the FBPA. 2" Because nonconsumers have no cause
of action under the FBPA, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit.'
IX.

CONCLUSION

In 1996, as in recent years, jurisdictional issues both at the trial and
appellate levels were at the forefront of the Eleventh Circuit's agenda.
While dauntless in defining the parameters of federal court jurisdiction,
the Eleventh Circuit appears deferential in addressing the interests of
state law and state court jurisdiction. The impact of new as well as old
Supreme Court decisions helped shape Eleventh Circuit opinions in
many substantive areas. There were also several issues of first
impression this year. As the cases featured in this Survey demonstrate,
the wide range of complexities of practice in the federal arena requires
a continued and close scrutiny of the ongoing developments in federal
civil procedure.

244. Id at 180-81, 465 S.E.2d at 671.
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